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Introduction 
In early November 2011, the President of the European Commission 
(EC) José Manuel Barroso warned of a crash that would instantly wipe 
out half of the value of Europe’s economy, plunging the continent into a 
depression  as  deep  as  the  1930s  slump.  The  result  of  such  an 
economic shock would be the emergence of extremism and divisions 
within Europe, the former Portuguese prime minister told his German 
audience. “Just as the founding fathers had a vision of Europe after 
two devastating world wars, we must also now act with resilience and 
with vision towards a Europe that is strong but open,” he said. “Now is 
Germany’s  time  to  show  that  it  is  fighting  the  cause  of  a  strong, 
integrated and competitive Europe”.
1 
It was a serious warning, though designed and targeted at the German 
audience. The problem is that it may also have been too little too late. 
For two years, systemic and pervasive eurozone problems have been 
deferred or treated with partial solutions, and time is running out.  
What specifically led to these very serious warnings in mid-autumn of 
2011? And what would be the role of China in the rescue operations of 
the eurozone? This brief examines these issues by taking a broader 
look into the retreat of globalization in the aftermath of the global crisis 
of 2008 before turning its attention to the eurozone crisis. The brief 
then provides an overview of the evolution of the EU-China relations 
and  considers  the  role  and  responses  of  China  to  the  unfolding 
eurozone crisis.   
________________________ 
1  “Debt Crisis: Barroso warns that eurozone collapse could trigger Great Depression 
II,” Irish Independent, November 11, 2011.
                                                 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In  early  November  2011,  the  Presi-
dent  of  the  European  Commission 
(EC) José Manuel Barroso warned of 
a crash that would instantly wipe out 
half of the value of Europe’s econo-
my,  plunging  the  continent  into  a 
depression  as  deep  as  the  1930s 
slump. It was a serious warning, and 
it was too little too late.  
 
This  policy  brief  examines  these  is-
sues  by  taking  a  broader  look  into 
the  retreat  of  globalization  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  global  crisis  of 
2008; that is, the context for the un-
folding eurozone crisis, in which the 
risk  of  a  “Lehman  moment”  is  in-
creasing. It was during these days of 
rude  awakening  that  the  region’s 
think-tanks,  observers  and  analysts 
began speculating if China will be the 
eurozone’s white knight. 
 
Today,  the  EU  and  China  are  each 
others'  largest  trading  partners.  In 
the  Western  media,  China  is  often 
portrayed  as  awash  with  cash,  pri-
marily due to its large US$3.2 trillion 
foreign exchange reserves. Nonethe-
less,  China’s  reserves  are  for  the 
most part invested in long-term so-
vereign debt instruments.  
 
In  the  recent  eurozone  and  G20 
summits,  Chinese  investment  could 
have been facilitated into the euro-
zone by (a) making it easier for Chi-
nese  firms  and  investors  to  acquire 
hard assets; (b) by recognizing China 
as  a  market-oriented  economy 
ahead of the World Trade Organiza-
tion's  (WTO)  scheduled  date  for 
doing so in 2016; (c) by accelerating 
reforms  in  international  multilateral 
organizations  (WTO,  IMF,  World 
Bank)  in  which  Europeans  have  a 
disproportionate representation.  
 
Unfortunately  difficult  decisions 
were avoided in the various summits. 
In the coming months, whether the 
challenges  of  the  eurozone  can  be 
overcome  will  depend  on  how  lea-
dership in the eurozone and the in-
ternational community can be mobi-
lized  to  make  the  necessary  deci-
sions.    
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Globalisation at Risk? 
Economic  integration  occurs  through  trade, 
migration, and capital flows. Since about 1870, all 
these flows rapidly became substantial, driven by 
falling costs of transportation. This first wave was 
reversed  by  a  retreat  into  nationalism  and 
protectionism  between  1914  and  1945.  After 
World  War  II,  trade  barriers  came  down,  while 
transport  costs  continued  to  fall.  This  second 
wave  of  globalisation  benefited  primarily  the 
advanced economies. It was their “golden era”. 
Beginning  in  1980  many  developing  countries 
broke  into  the  world  markets  for  manufactured 
goods  and  services;  concurrently,  foreign  direct 
investment  (FDI)  increased.  This  triggered  the 
rise of the large emerging economies such as the 
BRICs. That era ended in fall 2008. 
In spring 2008, the Baltic Dry Index, which has 
often been used as a short-hand for international 
trade,  climaxed  at  11,800;  today,  it  lingers  at 
about  1,800.  In  late  October  2011,  the  WTO’s 
report said that weak growth and macroeconomic 
imbalances  globally  are  “testing  the  political 
resolve of many governments to abide by the G-
20  commitment  to  resist  protectionism”.
2  The 
challenges are reflected in the financial sector, as 
evidenced  by  the  market  capitalization  of  more 
than  50  stock  exchanges  worldwide.  It,  too, 
peaked  $64.5  trillion  at  the  end  of  2007.  After 
gradual recovery, it climbed to $59.2 trillion last 
April. With the escalation of the eurozone crisis, it 
has fluctuated around $45-49 trillion in the past 
month. 
In  the  post-recession  periods,  stock  exchanges 
and  international  trade  typically  picked  up.  This 
time,  it  is  different.  Due  to  the  accumulation  of 
debt,  growth  is  likely  to  be  sub-optimal  in  the 
advanced  economies  in  the  short-  and  perhaps 
even medium-term. Due to the stagnation in the 
                                                 
2 Report on G-20 Trade Measures, World Trade 
Organization, October 25, 2011. 
export markets and FDI sources, growth will also 
be  relatively  slower,  though  still  solid,  in  the 
emerging  and  developing  economies.  To  make 
things  worse,  the  phenomenon  of  rising  energy 
prices is here to stay after more than two decades 
of  cheap  energy.  As  downside  risks  are 
heightened,  globalisation  persists.  The  path  of 
nationalism,  protectionism  and  competitive 
currency  devaluations  was  tested  in  the  1930s. 
Today, the stakes are far higher and more global.  
The Unfolding Eurozone Crisis 
The eurozone crisis initially seemed to come out 
of  the  blue,  at  least  as  far  as  Brussels  was 
concerned.  In  March  2010,  European 
Commission  President  José  Manuel  Barroso 
introduced  the  European  Union’s  10-year 
economic  strategy.
3  Europe  2020  sums  up  the 
European model of social market economy with a 
strong focus on environmental sustainability, said 
EU  Council  President  Herman  Van  Rompuy.  
Only  weeks  later  however,  European  leaders 
were  feverishly  putting  in  place  an  intervention 
mechanism to preserve stability in the region as 
Greece’s debt turmoil spread further afield.  
Since  May  2010,  the  eurozone  has  witnessed 
several  efforts  to  restore  fiscal  sustainability. 
Some  countries  have  opted  for  tough  fiscal 
measures seeking to increase taxes or cut public 
spending. Still, other countries have put their faith 
in higher GDP growth rates, but that requires time 
which is rapidly running out. While other countries 
are  able  to  raise  funds  through  monetary 
issuance  by  their  national  central  banks,  the 
eurozone member states cannot.
4 The European 
                                                 
3 Aiming at “smart, sustainable, inclusive growth,” the 
strategy proposed raising the employment rate of the 
European labor force, investing 3 per cent of GDP in R&D, 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20 per cent, 
compared to 1990 levels, and reducing the number of 
Europeans living below national poverty lines by 25 per 
cent. 
4 The national central banks of the Eurozone members are 
subject to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). 
Since 17 EU states of the 27 EU states have joined the euro, EU Centre Policy Brief  3 
 
   
Central  Bank  (ECB)  administers  the  monetary 
policy of the 17 eurozone economies; and it has 
the  exclusive  right  to  authorize  the  issuance  of 
euro banknotes. As a result, eurozone economies 
– as Greece, Ireland, and Portugal are – cannot 
use devaluation to improve their competitiveness. 
Nor can the ECB engage in traditional measures 
to support ailing eurozone economies as long as 
it is focused on a “phantom threat of inflation” in 
an  increasingly  recessionary  and  deflationary 
environment. Despite all the rhetoric, the ECB will 
have few alternatives but to soon bow to pressure 
to  print  money  to  prevent  a  potentially  fatal 
escalation of the eurozone debt crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initially,  the  soaring  public  debt  levels  in  the 
eurozone were seen as a fall-out from the global 
financial crisis. If only the crisis had been averted, 
the argument goes, the debt levels would not be a 
problem. Nonetheless, the realities were far more 
difficult. After the third quarter of 2011, there were 
several  eurozone  nations  in  the  top-10  riskiest 
sovereigns  worldwide,  namely  Portugal,  Ireland, 
and  Italy.  In  Italy,  the  risk  had  increased 
dramatically  since  mid-2011. While  Greece  was 
                                                                                   
the ESCB could not be used as the monetary authority of 
the Eurozone.  
not in this list, its yields soared again soon after 
the list was published (Figure 1). 
The  turmoil  was  initially  concentrated  in  small 
economies, each of which represents less than 3 
per  cent  of  eurozone  GDP,  and  the  problems 
could be contained. However, by autumn of 2011, 
the  debt  crisis  had  deepened  to  threaten  the 
bigger  economies.    Continued  talk  of  Greek 
bailouts,  downgrades  in  Italy  and  Spain  and 
concerns  from  the  US  about  how  the  crisis  is 
being handled did little to help market sentiment 
for  European  debt  with  the  euro  also  facing 
selling  pressure.  The  extensions  of  the  EFSF 
helped  the  market,  but  only  briefly  as  “euro 
hopes” were soon surpassed by “euro fears.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In  early  November,  Italian  ten-year  bond  yields 
topped  the  7  per  cent  level  widely  deemed 
unsustainable,  and  its  prime  minister,  Silvio 
Berlusconi, agreed to step down. Only days later, 
right before the election, Spain was forced to pay 
nearly 7 per cent on an issue of 10-year debt, the 
highest  since  1997.  Now  investors  are 
increasingly  eyeing  France  –  the  eurozone’s 
weakest  triple-A  rated  sovereign,  as  the  next 
domino  to  fall  in  a  sovereign  debt  crisis  that  is 
ever growing.  EU Centre Policy Brief  4 
 
   
In the past, public debt soared when it was used 
as the ultimate shock absorber, especially during 
times  of  war  and  conflict,  such  as World War I 
and II. In peacetime, public debt climbed during 
the bad years, but unfortunately, did not declined 
much in periods of growth. From the mid-1960s to 
the  mid-80s,  primary  spending  increased  quite 
rapidly  in  the  advanced  economies,  reflecting 
predominantly a surge in health care and pension 
spending. 
The negative effects of the global financial crisis 
may  diminish  by  the  mid-2010s.  By  then, 
however, advanced economies will have to cope 
with the massive challenge of reducing debt ratios 
when  pressures  from  health  care  and  pension 
systems  will  put  additional  pressure  on  public 
finances.  With  large  primary  gaps  and  rising 
health  care  and  pension  spending,  public  debt 
would spiral out of control in the absence of fiscal 
adjustment.  Under  unchanged  policies,  the  net 
debt-to-GDP  ratio  of  the  G7  economies  would 
have reached 200 per cent by 2030 and exceed 
440 per cent by 2050.
5 
Addressing  these  fiscal  challenges  in  a 
comprehensive  way  would  require  pro -growth 
structural  reforms,  gradual  and  steady  fiscal 
adjustment,  stronger  fi scal  institutions  and 
adequate and  equitable burden sharing among 
the relevant stakeholders. And yet, the effort to 
stumble  through  the  crisis  has  effectively 
mitigated  attempts   at  such  comp rehensive 
reforms  as evidenced by the current eur ozone 
turmoil.  
EU Paralysis at the G20 Summit
6 
Before  the  G20  summit  in  Cannes,  French 
President  Nicolas  Sarkozy,  along  with  German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, had hoped to tout the 
                                                 
5 Cottarelli, C. and Schaechter, A. (2010), Long-Term Trends 
in Public Finances in the G-7 Economies, IMF Staff Position 
Note, September 1. 
6 This section was previously published as ‘Euro-paralysis at 
G20 summit’ in China Daily, November 9, 2011.  
merits of the recent eurozone deal and to return 
to  his  original  ambitious  agenda  for  the  G20.
7 
That all fell apart with political turmoil caused by 
Greek Premier George Papandreou’s decision to 
call  a  referendum  on  the  latest  EU  bailout 
package,  which  would  effectively  have  been  a 
referendum on Greece’s membership of the euro, 
a  decision  that  was  reversed  later.  There  was 
also  confidence  vote  in  parliament  on  his 
leadership,  which  he  narrowly  survived.  In  late 
October,  the  eurozone  summit  agreed  on  a 
“comprehensive plan,” which  was in fact partial, 
but  initially  caused  market  euphoria.  With  their 
deal,  eurozone  leaders  hoped  to  achieve  three 
goals: 
  To  expand  the  liquidity  facility  from  the 
current €440 billion ($610 billion) to €1-2 
trillion  ($1.4-2.8  trillion).  However,  the 
current deal will use leverage, which may 
contribute to turmoil in the future. 
  To  recapitalize  the  “systemically  critical” 
banks  inside  the  eurozone  by  €100-110 
billion ($140-155 billion). In reality, 70  of 
them must raise €106 billion ($150 billion) 
by mid-2012, which may be challenging as 
the region may already be in a recession. 
  To  increase  Greek  debt  reductions  from 
the current 21 per cent to 50 per cent. The 
second  Greek  bailout  plan,  whose  costs 
amount  to  €130  billion,  may  be  back  on 
track,  for  now.  But  Greece  alone  will 
consume  at  least  €500  billion  ($700 
billion)  in  2010-20,  in  order  to  avoid 
default. 
Meanwhile,  other  eurozone  challenges  – 
misguided  fiscal  policies,  inadequate  monetary 
                                                 
7 As the holder of the G20 and G8 presidencies, the 
ambitious French agenda, which President Nicolas Sarkozy 
hoped to initiate before the presidential election year of 
2012, comprised efforts to reform the international 
financial system, address imbalances in global economic 
governance and regulate commodities markets.  EU Centre Policy Brief  5 
 
   
policies (which the new ECB chief Mario Draghi is 
finally trying to change), the toxic assets of the 
ECB,  inadequate  structural  reforms  and  growth 
policies  continue  to  simmer.  After  two  years  of 
turmoil,  European  leaders  have  still  failed  to 
contain the eurozone debt crisis. Greece remains 
a problem, but Italy could crash the euro. 
Even as Europeans found themselves in a crisis 
that  they  barely  saw  coming,  trade  and 
investment relations between the EU and China 
were soaring and growing ever deeper.  
Evolution of EU-China Relations 
Relations  between  the  EU  and  China  were 
established in 1975 and the two are each others' 
largest  trading  partners.
8  In  2010,  the  EU 
replaced the  United  States  as China's  biggest 
trading partner as Sino-European trade, with a 
volume of  $217.3 billion, exceeded the Sino-US 
trade  volume  by  some  $5.7  billion.  European 
companies such as Airbus, Siemens, Nokia and 
Volkswagen,  made  the  EU  the  fourth  largest 
investor  in  China  and  China's  most  important 
supplier of technology.  
Bilateral relations are governed by the 1985 EU -
China Trade and Cooperation Agreement . Since 
2007,  negotiations  have  been  underway  to 
upgrade  this  to  a  new  Partnership  and 
Cooperation Agreement and there are already 24 
sectoral dialogues and agreements, ranging from 
environmental protection to education. 
Evolution of Economic Relations 
At the end of the Cold War, relations with Europe 
were  not  as  high  a  priority  for  China  as  its 
relations  with  the  US,  Japan  and  other  Asian 
powers. However, China’s efforts towards closer 
bilateral relations with the EU, and its interest in a 
multipolar  system  increased  as  economic 
contacts  with  the  outside  world  grew.  Although 
European leaders had imposed an arms embargo 
                                                 
8 “China beats US to become EU's top trade partner,” EU 
Observer, October 17, 2011. 
on China after the Tiananmen Square events of 
1989,  they  sought  to  ease  China’s  isolation 
through  continued  economic  contacts.  Most 
importantly,  China’s  growing  economy  became 
the  focus  for  many  European  businesses  and 
Chinese  businessmen  also  began  to  make 
frequent  trips  to  Europe.  High-level  exchanges 
ensued in the 1990s. Starting from a relatively low 
base,  the  EU-Chinese  trade  expanded  even 
faster than the Chinese economy itself, tripling in 
a  decade  from  $14.3  billion  in  1985  to  $45.6 
billion in 1994.
9 France, in particular, was leading 
the EU's effort for closer ties to establish a multi -
polar world and was the first, along with Russia, 
to  establish  strategic  partnerships  with  China. 
After  the  Chirac  era,  the  EU -China  relations 
cooled  down  briefly  particularly  after  China’s 
cancellation  of  the  annual  EU-China  summit  in 
November  2008,  in  protest  against  French 
President Sarkozy's plans to meet with the Dalai 
Lama.
10 
Evolution of Trade Relations 
Most  of  the  EU-China  bilateral  trade  is  in 
industrial  and  manufactured  goods.  In  2009-10, 
EU exports to China increased by 38 per cent and 
China's  exports  to  the  EU  increased  by  31  per 
cent (Figure 2).
11 
                                                 
9 Despite occasional roadblocks, economic cooperation 
continued to deepen, with the EU's "New Asia Strategy", 
the first Asia–Europe Meeting in 1996, the 1998 EU-China 
summit and frequent policy documents advocating closer 
partnerships with China. Even following the financial crisis 
in 1997, EU-Chinese trade increased by 15 per cent in 1998. 
See Sutter, Robert G. (2008) Chinese Foreign 
Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers), 
p.340-342. 
10  However EU-China has experienced a cool down after 
China canceled the EU-China yearly summit in November 
2008. This was apparently caused due to French President 
Sarkozy's plans to meet with the Dalai Lama.  See “Business 
fears over Chinese-French rift,” Financial Times, November 
26, 2008. 
11 Friction has focused on few areas, including the dispute 
over textile imports into the EU. The dispute over textile 
imports into the EU (the Bra wars) with domestic European EU Centre Policy Brief  6 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2010, Chinese imports in the EU amounted to 
€282 billion, while the EU exports to China grew 
to  $113  billion.  The  EU’s  trade  deficit  in  goods 
was €169 billion.  
However, in the area of trade in services, Chinese 
commercial services in the EU amounted to €16 
billion, while the EU services to China exceeded 
€20 billion. The EU’s trade surplus was €4 billion. 
Chinese direct investment into EU was only less 
than  €6  billion,  while  EU  investment  soared  to 
more  than  €58  billion.  China’s  FDI  deficit 
ballooned to €53 billion.  
Just before the EU summit in late October 2011, 
China surpassed the United States as the largest 
trade partner of the EU, exceeding that of the EU 
and the U.S. by €800 million and accounting for 
13.4  per  cent  of  the  region’s  total  imports  and 
exports. In July, trade b etween China and the EU 
totaled  €35.6  billion  ($49.4  billion),  even  as 
bilateral  trade  shrank  for  a  second  consecutive 
month. 
 
 
                                                                                   
manufactures losing out to cheaper Chinese imported 
goods. This conflict was resolved through negotiations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meanwhile,  China  remained  the  EU's  second 
largest export market.
12 At the same time, the EU 
reported a €12.2 billion trade deficit with China.  
Along  with  concerns  over  intellectual  property 
rights protection in China and EU firms’ access to 
China’s government procurement market, a major 
point  of  contention  in relations  between  the  EU 
and  China  remains  the  EU's  arms  embargo  on 
China.
13 
                                                 
12 EU exports to China totaled 11.7 billion euros in July, up 
12.3 per cent year-on-year, which is higher than EU's total 
export growth rate of 4.1 per cent. The EU imported €23.9 
billion in Chinese goods, down 6.2 per cent from the 
previous year. But China still held the top spot as the 
region's import source, making up 17.4 per cent of the EU's 
total imports. 
13 Unlike economic relations, progress in political and 
security co-operation was slower and occasionally 
hampered.  Unlike the United States, the EU does not have 
comparable security interests in Asia or U.S.-style export 
controls for China. However, it continues to maintain an 
arms embargo, which was instituted after the Tiananmen 
Square events in 1989. While the embargo remains, China 
buys much of its arms from Russia, and the embargo may 
not be as tight as thought. High Representative Catherine 
Ashton put forward plans for lifting the embargo in 2010. 
Ashton argued that "The current arms embargo is a major 
impediment for developing stronger EU-China co-operation 
on foreign policy and security matters." The plan was 
rejected then but is thought to still be on the drawing EU Centre Policy Brief  7 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                   
board. See “Ashton pragmatic on China in EU foreign policy 
blueprint,” EU Observer, December 17. 
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China’s largest trade partners in Europe are also 
the  larger  member  states  in  the  EU.  Between 
2000 and 2009, their combined exports to China 
more than doubled from just 13.1 to 32.6 per cent 
of the total (Figure 3).  
In each case, exports to China have soared in the 
past  decade.  All  seek  to  enhance  and  deepen 
their  bilateral  relationship.  EU  nations,  such  as 
Italy  and  Spain  that  compete  relatively  more  in 
low-tech industries have been stronger advocates 
of  anti-dumping  actions  against  China.  On  the 
other  hand,  most  support  lifting  the  EU  arms 
embargo on China, under certain conditions. 
Germany.  Germany  is  China’s  largest  trading 
partner in the EU by far. The bilateral relationship 
has  been  dominated  by  commercial  and 
economic  links,  though  political  and  security 
problems  are  growing  in  importance.  German 
delegations  visit  China  frequently,  as  has 
Chancellor Merkel every year, as did Chancellor 
Schröder  before  her.  Between  2000  and  2009, 
the exports of Germany to China quadrupled to 
€36.4  billion,  accounting  for  12.2  per  cent  of 
Germany’s external trade. 
UK. The UK is the third largest EU trading partner 
for  China.  It  is  not  viewed  in  China  as  a  key 
technology and manufacturing partner in the way 
Germany is. It has been the largest EU investor in 
China,  though  Germany  now  claims  to  have 
overtaken it. Between 2000 and 2009, UK exports 
to  China  more  than  doubled  to  €5.7  billion, 
accounting for 4 per cent of its external trade. 
France. Since 2004, “global strategic partnership” 
has  served  as  a  framework  for  relations  in 
political dialogue, economic exchanges, cultural, 
scientific  and  technical  cooperation  etc.  France 
has  the  largest  Chinese  community  in  Europe. 
France has been a leading advocate of lifting the 
EU arms embargo on China. Between 2000 and 
2009, the exports of France to China more than 
doubled to €7.9 billion, accounting for 5.4 per cent 
of its external trade. 
Italy. Italy’s objectives include increasing market 
share in China for Italian products and attracting 
Chinese  investment  to  Italy.  Due  to  cheap 
Chinese  products  (e.g.,  textiles,  shoes),  China 
has been perceived as a “threat” to Italian jobs 
and standard of living. Chinese immigration is a 
significant issue. While Italy has consistently been 
against  awarding  Market  Economy  Status  to 
China,  it  has  supported  lifting  arms  embargo. 
Between 2000 and 2009, the exports of Italy to 
China  more  than  doubled  to  €6.6  billion, 
accounting for 5 per cent of its external trade. 
Spain.  Spain  is  interested  in  improving  its 
balance of trade and opening up sectors of the 
Chinese economy. However, it has a low profile in 
Beijing, although rising in importance. Trade with 
China has been proportionately small for Spain’s 
economic size. Spain has been strong advocate 
of  anti-dumping  actions,  especially  on  footwear, 
but the government has repeatedly stated its full 
support for lifting the EU arms embargo. Between 
2000 and 2009, Spanish exports to China almost 
quadrupled to €2 billion, accounting for 6 per cent 
of its external trade. 
The White Knight to the Rescue of the 
Eurozone? 
With China’s increasing economic links to various 
EU  countries,  and  as  the  debt  crisis  situation 
deteriorated rapidly  in  the  eurozone,  an  intense 
debate ensued on the possible role of China as 
the  white  knight.  Only  months  before,  Italy’s 
finance minister Giulio Tremonti still wrote about 
the  threat  of  China’s  “reverse  colonization”  of 
Europe.
14  However,  the  tone  changed 
dramatically as markets began  to demand rising 
yields  to  purchase  Italy’s  sovereign  debt,  which 
was expected to exceed 120 per cent of GDP by 
the  close  of  the  year,  a  ratio  second  only  to 
Greece  in  the  eurozone.  In  a  curious  reversal, 
Tremonti began to court China in order to attract 
                                                 
14 “Italy turns to China for help in debt crisis,” Financial 
Times, September 12, 2011. EU Centre Policy Brief  9 
 
   
Chinese  investments.  He  was  not  alone;  many 
European  leaders  are  now  seeking  closer 
“strategic relations” with China, just as they are 
courting  other  large  emerging  economies,  such 
as India, Brazil, and Russia. 
Meanwhile, other European leaders warn against 
what  they  perceive  as  concessions  to  China. 
While the eurozone may be desperate for outside 
investors, some others fear that Brussels or the 
leaders  of  individual  eurozone  nations  or  both 
would offer China political concessions in return 
for economic assistance. In this regard, the key 
problem  is  the  rescue  fund,  known  as  the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). For 
months, European leaders had been pushing the 
idea of a “big bazooka”; a multiple increase of its 
liquidity  facility,  perhaps  even  up  to  €1-2 trillion 
that would finally calm the market turmoil. By the 
eve of the EU summit of October 26, 2011, the 
consensus was that the bailout fund was simply 
too  small.  The  fund's  lending  capacity  of  €440 
billion was not even close enough to prevent the 
spread of contagion to the core, which includes 
Italy and Spain.
15  
At the EU summit, the European leaders, u nder 
the  leadership  of  President  Sarkozy  and 
Chancellor Merkel, agreed to leverage the rescue 
fund because they could not agree on how to 
increase  it.
16  "If  we  in  Europe  organize  the 
stabilization of the euro in such a way that we 
                                                 
15 European leaders agreed that the EFSF would explore 
two plans to increase its remaining firepower from about 
€250bn to €1,000bn. One would be to offer investors insur-
ance on selected government debt while the other would 
create a special fund in which countries such as China could 
invest. 
16 As it was soon realized that finding investors to boost the 
fund's lending capacity to €1 trillion might not be as simple 
as initially thought, they deferred the problem to the G20 
Summit in Cannes, France. The quest for financial support, 
in turn, compelled the leaders of the crisis economies to 
approach Beijing. That was a red flag to those euro 
interests, which, along with U.S. unions, regarded the RMB 
as undervalued and prefer faster and more substantial 
appreciation to push their own exports. 
allow  states  to  exert  political  influence  from 
outside,  then  we  are  making  a  tremendous 
mistake," said Hans-Peter Keitel, president of the 
Federation of German Industry.
17  
 
At  this  point,  China  was  seen  as  a  likely 
contributor to the eurozone’s bailout fund but the 
scope of its involvement would depend on  
European leaders satisfying some key conditions. 
Any  Chinese  support  would  depend  on 
contributions  from  other  countries  and  Beijing 
expected  to  be  given  strong  guarantees  on  the 
safety  of  its  investment.  China  hoped  to  assist 
because  the  eurozone  is  its  largest  trading 
partner,  but  this  support  was  predicated  on  the 
interests of Chinese people.
18 
With $3,200 billion in foreign exchange reserves, 
a quarter of which are believed to be held in 
euros, China was seen to be willing to contribute 
between $50-100 billion to the EFSF or a new 
fund set up under its auspices in coll aboration 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
19 The 
drive for EFSF investors has highlighted Europe's 
growing reliance on major emerging economies - 
and also China's increased influence on the world 
stage.
20 
                                                 
17 “Raising Money for the Eurozone: Warnings Mount 
against Concessions to China,” Spiegel, Oct 31. 
18 According to Professor Li Daokui, an academic member of 
China’s central bank monetary policy committee, “The last 
thing China wants is to throw away the country’s wealth 
and be seen as just a source of dumb money.” He added 
that Beijing might also ask European leaders to refrain from 
criticizing China’s currency policy, a frequent source of ten-
sion with trade partners. See “China could play key role in 
EU rescue,” Financial Times, October 27, 2011. 
19 Ibid. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France welcomed the 
prospect of a Chinese contribution to the Eurozone rescue 
package. “Our independence would not be put into ques-
tion by this,” he said in a television interview. “Why would 
we not accept that the Chinese had confidence in the Euro-
zone and place a part of their surpluses in our funds or our 
banks. Would you rather they placed it with the US?”  
20 One condition China might ask for is that its contribution 
be at least partly denominated in renminbi, which would EU Centre Policy Brief  10 
 
   
Some  Europeans  see  a  “scramble  for  Europe” 
taking  place  as  China  purchases  European 
government  debt,  invests  in  European 
companies,  and  exploits  Europe’s  open  market 
for  public  procurement.
21  From their viewpoint, 
crisis-hit  Europe’s  need  for  short-term  cash  is 
allowing  China  not  just  to  strike  cut-price  deals 
but also to play off member states against each 
other  and  against  their  own  collective  interests, 
replicating a strategy it has already used in the 
developing  world.  In  particular,  the  European 
Council for Foreign Relations (ECFR)
22 believes 
that the expansion of China’s presence in Europe 
is  creating  new  fault  lines  within  Europe  and 
making  it  much  harder  to  implement  the  more 
coordinated and tougher strategy towards China 
that  the  EU  was  beginning  to  develop.  As 
Europeans compete with each other for Chinese 
business,  they  are  reducing  their  chances  of 
collectively  negotiating  reciprocal  access  to 
Chinese  markets.  Starting  with  a  set  of 
assumptions, they focus on three scenarios.
23 (1) 
                                                                                   
protect its investment against currency fluctuations. China 
would buy euro-denominated bonds but repayments would 
compensate for any changes in the value of the renminbi, 
which has appreciated nearly 20 per cent against the euro 
in the past three years.  
21 The very title of the ECFR paper, “The Scramble for 
Europe” portrayed the pre-crisis Tremonti’s 
characterization of the Eurozone as an innocent continent, 
such as Africa in the late 19
th century, which was being 
swept by neo-colonial forces from the East. ECFR saw in the 
crisis an opportunity to seize the crisis to foster integration 
across the fragmented euro nations. See François 
Godement and Jonas Parello-Plesner with Alice Richard 
(2011) “The Scramble for Europe, ”European Council on 
Foreign Relations, September, 2011. 
22 See John Fox & François Godement (2009), A Power Audit 
of EU-China Relations, A Policy Report, European Council 
for Foreign Relations, April 2009. 
23 In their Rescuing the euro: What is China’s price? 
(forthcoming, ECFR, November 2011), François Godement 
and Jonas Parello-Plesner  believe that (1) China (among 
Asian and other economies) wants to invest money away 
from the dollar, has an interest in preserving and growing 
exports in Europe and fears the global bust that would 
follow a deep European recession or systemic crisis. (2) But 
China is also perceived as deeply risk-averse, and 
In  the  best  case,  the  eurozone’s  rescue  fund 
(EFSF) saves the region and China shifts some 
currency  reserves  towards  the  euro.  (2)  In  the 
medium  case,  IMF  comes  to  the  rescue  and 
China  seizes  the  opportunity  to  offer  Renminbi 
funds, transferring exchange risk to the European 
borrowers.  (3)  In  the  worst  case,  EFSF  fails  to 
contain the crisis, the IMF focuses on the rescue 
of  the  peripheral  economies,  major  economies 
are swept by a crisis, and creditors get the driving 
seat. 
All  three  scenarios  have  provided  fodder  for 
media and think-tank speculation in the past few 
weeks. However, realities are complex. The first 
scenario is invalid because it is predicated on the 
idea  that  the  eurozone  crisis  is  only  one  of 
liquidity  or  solvency.  The  second  scenario  is 
predicated on the notion that the IMF can and will 
rescue  both  the  peripheral  and  the  core 
economies of the eurozone, which – at least with 
current IMF funding – is either highly unlikely or 
simply  impossible.  The  third  scenario  is  also 
unlikely because the IMF would need additional 
funding to rescue the peripheral economies from 
some  of  the  core  economies,  whose  economic 
challenges it would have to ignore. Furthermore, 
neither China nor the other BRIC economies are 
likely  to  support  the  eurozone  unless  the  core 
economies in the region do the same and unless 
certain  other  conditions  apply  (see  the  last 
section). 
The EU would have more leverage in dealing with 
China, the other BRICs and creditors, if the region 
would  be  more  united  and  transparent  in  its 
borrowing  process.  However,  the  current 
                                                                                   
particularly unenthusiastic about the sort of domestic 
political uncertainty and institutional complexity that 
Europeans are creating for themselves – both in domestic 
politics and in their byzantine institutional set-ups. (3) 
China will therefore "help" Europe if Europe helps itself. 
This means setting up a convincing argument and 
guarantees for outside investors. (4) The US has found such 
a modus vivendi with China on debt. Europe has yet to get 
to such a level playing field. EU Centre Policy Brief  11 
 
   
economic turmoil makes political unity less viable. 
The  problem  is  that  it  is  no  longer  possible  to 
underestimate  the  eurozone’s  economic 
problems, which are pervasive and systematic. 
Europe’s ‘Too Big to Fail’ Economies 
According to ECFR, there are currently two key 
groups of EU economies, vis-à-vis economic and 
political attitudes to China: the frustrated market-
openers  (Germany,  UK,  France,  Netherlands), 
and  the  cash-strapped  deal  seekers  (the 
Southern  European  crisis  economies,  Eastern 
European transitional economies), while the rest 
(Austria, Ireland, Belgium, Finland) are between 
these two camps (compare Figure 4). In reality, 
the  groups  and  the  underlying  economic 
environment  are  far  more  complex.  Instead  of 
stated or observed attitudes, it is more useful to 
focus on hard data – the countries’ GDP, gross 
debt  (per  cent  of  GDP)  and  current  account 
balance (per cent of GDP) – which may also have 
greater  predictive  value.  The  GDP  serves  as  a 
short-hand  for  bargaining  power,  whereas 
indebtedness  and  the  current  account  balance 
point  to  the  constraints  over  that  power.  This 
exercise reveals four different strategic groups of 
European nations (Figure 5).  
(1) Fiscally-responsible Northern states within 
the  eurozone  (Germany,  Netherlands, 
Finland)  
(2) High-deficit/debt  Southern  eurozone 
economies  (Greece,  Portugal,  Italy, 
Spain), which suffer from current account 
deficits and soaring gross debt. 
Despite  their  differences  and  diversity,  these 
groups  are  fairly  similar;  and  the  latter  also 
includes the UK, a country not in the eurozone. 
However, there are two additional groups.  
(3) Privileged  small  eurozone  economies 
such  as  Luxembourg,  and  non-eurozone  
economies (Sweden) which enjoy current 
account  surpluses  and  moderate  gross 
debt;  
(4) New  member  states  (Poland,  Romania 
Czech Republic), which comprise primarily 
transitional or emerging Eastern European 
nations  and  which  have  relatively  small 
GDPs,  and  suffer  from  current  account 
deficits  but  have  not  yet  accrued 
substantial gross debt.  
Except  for  Luxembourg,  the  former  represents 
relatively wealthy non-eurozone economies which 
seek to optimize their strategic maneuverability in 
the changing Europe. In turn, the latter represents 
relatively  poor  non-eurozone  economies  that 
hope to catch up with their EU neighbours in the 
footsteps of Estonia. 
The  economic  status  of  each  strategic  group 
shapes  its  general  attitude  toward  China,  but  it 
does not determine that attitude. Both Chancellor 
Merkel’s Germany and Prime Minister Katainen’s 
Finland  share  a  similar  approach  to  fiscal  and 
monetary  policies,  but  each  has  a  different 
historical legacy in its approach to China. Cash-
strapped economies, such as Greece and Spain 
may  share  a  generic  economic  attitude  toward 
China,  but  their  bilateral  political  legacy  is 
different.  The  same  goes  for  the  transitional 
Eastern European economies and the small circle 
of  privileged  small  European  economies,  which 
still  have  their  own  currency  and  central  bank. 
The  generic  strategic  groups  do  have  affinities; 
thus  the  envisioned  two-speed  Europe,  with 
Germany  and  France  in  the  driver’s  seat, 
underestimates future strains because France is 
an indebted deficit country and Germany is not.  
What is worrisome is not the differences among 
the EU nations, which only reflects their diverse 
and  heterogeneous  histories,  but  the  relatively 
substantial  concentration  of  these  economies 
among  the  high-deficit,  high-debt  nations, 
including  major  economies  such  as  Italy  and 
Spain, but, to a degree, even France and the UK. EU Centre Policy Brief  12 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As  the  markets’  unease  will  deepen,  the 
Europeans  will  struggle  for  a  bigger  liquidity 
facility.  The  recapitalization  of  the  major  banks 
will  be  debated  passionately.  Greek  turmoil  will 
continue  because  cooperation  between  ex-PM 
Papandreou’s  Socialists  and  Antonis  Samaras’ 
conservatives is easier said than done.  
In  the  past,  the  eurozone  problems  were 
resolvable  because  the  peripheral  economies  – 
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal – each represented 
less  than  3  per  cent  of  EU  GDP.  However,  if 
Spain  or  Italy,  the  two  major  “too  big  to  fail” 
economies,  fail  to  raise  money  at  reasonable 
interest  rates,  the  G20  will  be  forced  to  lead  a 
coordinated  response  to  avoid  the  adverse 
consequences on the world economy. Just a few 
months  ago,  Italy’s  Premier  Silvio  Berlusconi 
claimed there was no crisis in Italy, but even he 
had to accept highly intrusive IMF monitoring of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
his  government’s  promised  reforms.  That, 
however, is far from sufficient. 
As in the case of the small euro countries, bailing 
out Spain and Italy would require covering their 
public financing requirements for three years. The 
associated  loans  would  amount  to  about  $2.1 
trillion.  If  the  IMF  were  to  fund  one-third  of  the 
total, as it did in the case of the small peripheral 
countries, its share would amount to about $700 
billion,  almost  twice  the  current  new  lending 
capacity.  In  turn,  the  eurozone  countries  would 
have  to  raise  $1.4  trillion,  which  exceeds  the 
available capacity of the current rescue fund by 
over  $1  trillion.  Even  if  the  bailout  would  be 
possible, any sudden stop of financing to Spain 
and Italy would cause a severe recession in these 
major economies and a spillover effect on the rest 
of  Europe,  the  United  States,  and  the  BRICs. 
With  $850  billion  in  direct  exposure  and  an 
additional  $1.8  trillion  in  indirect  exposure (e.g., 
derivative  contracts  and  guarantees),  American EU Centre Policy Brief  13 
 
   
banks  would  be  in  harm’s  way  too.  Such 
developments would have adverse consequences 
worldwide. In the US, the “Lehman episode” took 
months; in the eurozone, it would require years. 
The stakes are higher: in the US, the subprime 
mortgage  market  peaked  at  $1-1.5  trillion, 
whereas  the  outstanding  debt  of  the  peripheral 
Europe amounts to $4.6 trillion (Figure 6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How Could China Support the Eurozone? 
While  we  should  still  be  mindful  of  the  brutal 
historical  legacy  of  European  colonialism, 
contemporary Europe has played a vital role for 
and in the BRICs, vis-à-vis trade and investment, 
science  and  technology,  finance  as  well  as  aid 
and  assistance.  In  the  long-term,  the  European 
markets and industries will continue to play a vital 
role for the BRICs.  
China has already bought billions of euros worth 
of bonds from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain.
24  In  addition,  investors  from  China  and 
Hong Kong bought 6 per   cent  of  the  €5  billion 
initial issuance of the EFSF benchmark bond in 
                                                 
24  “Wen: China will continue to buy European debt, EU 
observer , June 27, 2011; “China: EU bailout leaves 
'fundamental problems' unresolved,” EU observer, July 8, 
2011. 
January 2011. Earlier in the year, China signed 
multibillion  dollar  agreements  with  debt-ridden 
Spain to invest in projects ranging from energy to 
banking and oil. China has also agreed to enter 
into  numerous  business  contracts  with  Greece, 
the most severely affected European country.  
Naturally, Europe would like to see China, along 
with the BRICs, as the white knight.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However,  the  bond  market  channel  presents 
rising risks. According to a recent IMF report, half 
of  the  €6.5  trillion  stock  of  government  debt 
issued  by  euro  area  governments  is  showing 
signs of heightened credit risk.  
In the Western media, China is often portrayed as 
awash with cash, primarily due to its large $3.2 
trillion  foreign  exchange  reserves.  Nonetheless, 
China’s reserves are for the most part invested in 
long-term  sovereign  debt  instruments,  with 
around 60-65 per cent in U.S. dollar instruments, 
20-25 per cent in euro assets, and the remainder 
split  between  other  currencies.  Only  a  small 
fraction is held in highly liquid short-term paper. 
Prior  to  the  EU  summit,  China,  reportedly,  was 
considering an investment of $50-100 billion into 
the  eurozone;  1.6-3.2  per  cent  of  its  foreign EU Centre Policy Brief  14 
 
   
exchange  reserves.  Theoretically,  longer-dated 
instruments could be liquidated, but it would not 
make much sense from  the  Chinese  standpoint 
and could severely destabilize the markets. China 
could  also  accelerate  the  diversification  of  its 
reserves by investing more in euro assets.  But 
even that would not  be enough. In 2012 alone, 
the eurozone will need around €1.7 trillion ($2.4 
trillion), or 17.5 per cent of its estimated GDP, for 
refinancing.  Most  importantly,  Chinese  public 
opinion would not support such risk-taking. In the 
coming  years,  China  must  cope  with  its  own 
domestic  development  needs  and  Chinese 
investors  are mandated  to  seek  long-term,  high 
financial returns, within reasonable risk tolerance.  
The eurozone is China’s most important trading 
partner and takes up 20 per cent of China’s total 
exports, which is slightly more than the US share 
in  Chinese  exports.  It  is  also  China’s  primary 
technology  partner  and  key  source  of  FDI. 
European multinationals have played a vital role 
in China’s economic development. And yet, China 
has a stock of only €7 billion ($10 billion) in FDIs 
in the eurozone; just 3 per cent of its total outward 
FDI stock as of 2010 (Figure 7). 
The leaders of eurozone countries could facilitate 
Chinese  investments  into  the  eurozone  in  three 
ways:
25 
(1) Instead  of  paper  assets,  the  e urozone 
could make it easier for Chinese firms and 
investors to acquire hard assets. 
(2) The eurozone could recognize China as a 
market-oriented  economy  ahead  of  the 
World  Trade  Organisation’s  (WTO) 
scheduled date for doing so in 2016. 
(3) The  eurozone  could  be  more  willing  to 
yield  to  concessions  regarding  the 
representation  of  China  and  other  large 
emerging  economies  in  international 
                                                 
25  Steinbock, Dan (2011), “How Will China Support the 
Eurozone,” CNBC, October 29, 2011. 
multilateral  organizations  (WTO,  IMF, 
World Bank) in which Europeans have a 
disproportionate representation. 
Some  or  most  of  these  conditions  should  be 
fulfilled  for  greater  support  by  China  and  other 
BRIC economies. Additionally, they will seek for 
assurances  for  the  security  of  their  proposed 
investments  and,  naturally,  they  expect  core 
eurozone nations to purchase eurozone debt. 
Today,  the  eurozone  is  struggling  with  half  a 
dozen overwhelming challenges: misguided fiscal 
policies, inadequate monetary easing, insolvency 
crisis  (Greece  is  only  the  beginning),  a  grossly 
inadequate  liquidity  facility,  the  need  to 
recapitalize major banks, the central bank’s toxic 
assets, as well as challenges in competitiveness 
and innovation.
26 In turn, the Chinese people are 
Beijing’s first priority. The GDP per capita of the 
Chinese is still relatively low relative to European 
living standards. As long as China remains open 
and grows at 8-9 per cent per year, it can drive 
and  support  global  growth  significantly.    But 
neither  China  nor  the  BRICs  can  bailout  the 
eurozone economies because the challenges are 
too great, too pervasive, and too systemic. Just 
like China and the BRICs, Europe must stand on 
its  own;  or  it  will  fall.  The  eurozone  needs  to 
mobilize all the political will and support to make 
the difficult decisions that have been avoided and 
deferred for too long.  
 
                                                 
26  Steinbock, Dan  (2011) “Why the Eurozone Crisis Will 
Deteriorate Before It Will Get Better,” EconoMonitor, 
Roubini Global Economics, October 28, 2011. 
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